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"The securities laws exist because of the unique informational
needs of investors."' This is the opening sentence of one of the
great American books on securities regulation,2 expressing the in-
sight of Francis Bacon that knowledge is power.3 Every civilized
country will try to protect its citizens from the abuse of power, and
consequently, it should be no surprise that the regulation of infor-
mation becomes ever more expanded and, regrettably, compli-
cated.
Within the European Union ("EU"), a flurry of new initiatives
has been launched to unite its segregated financial markets and
emulate that coveted object of desire: the U.S. financial market of
the National Market System with its awe-inspiring size and liquid-
ity. One of these new initiatives is the proposal for a EU directive
on market abuse, which is the chosen patois of British securities
regulation for insider dealing and market manipulation, that was
put forward on May 30, 2001.4
* Dr. Jesper Lau Hansen is an associate professor in financial market law at
the Institute of Legal Science A of the University of Copenhagen Law Faculty,
Denmark.
1 JAMES D. Cox Er AL., SEcURIEs REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1997).
2 Id.
3 JOHN BARTLErt, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs (10th ed. 2000) (1919) (quoting Fran-
cis Bacon), available at http://wvw.bartleby.com/lOO/pages/page168.htnil.
4 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse),
COM(01)281 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket
/en/finances/mobil/com28len.pdf [hereinafter Proposal]. The phrases often dif-
fer. Insider trading is usually known as insider dealing in British law, and this is
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This Article offers a closer look at the Proposal and the Euro-
pean approach to regulating securities fraud that it embodies,
which is contrasted with the approach found in U.S. federal secu-
rities regulation.
1. THE ACTION PLAN AND ONWARDS
The European Union has among its foremost objectives the
creation of a single European market with free movement of per-
sons, goods, services, and capital. The most favored instrument of
harmonization is the directive, which is aimed at the Member States
that are obliged to implement its content into national law by way
of the usual legislative processes of the Member States.5
Harmonization of the very fragmented European capital mar-
ket was attempted by a string of directives in the 1980s, ending
with the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive.6 However, it is widely
recognized that they have failed to accomplish their objective.
also the label favored by the Proposal. Market manipulation, chosen by the Euro-
pean Commission, is also known as price manipulation, which is the preferred
phrase in Nordic and German law.
5 A directive of the European Union is only binding on the Member States, not
on the citizens, and has to be implemented into national law by a legislative effort
of the individual Member States, whereas a regulation has direct effect in national
law. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997,1997 O.J. (C
340) 3 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Implementation into national law can be carried
out either by a new act, an amendment to an existing act, or by an executive order
issued pursuant to an act. If national law already provides for the issues covered
by the directive, no legislative effort is called for, and the provisions of national
law will be construed as implementing the directive.
6 See Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21 (coordinating the condi-
tions for the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing); Council Di-
rective 80/390,1980 O.J. (L 100) 1 (coordinating the requirements for the drawing
up, scrutiny, and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the ad-
mission of securities to official stock exchange listing); Council Directive 82/121,
1982 O.J. (L 48) 26 (listing information to be published on a regular basis by com-
panies the shares of which have been admitted to an official stock exchange list-
ing); and Council Directive 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (giving the information to
be published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed
of). These directives and amendments have been joined in a codification direc-
tive. See Amendments Directive 001/34 Parliament and Council on the Admis-
sion of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing and on Information to be
Published on Those Securities, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 1. The last directive of the 1980s
was Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 (coordinating regulations on
insider dealing). This directive would be replaced by the new directive on market
abuse. See Proposal, supra note 4. The 1980 Directive on Listing Particulars, now
part of the codification directive, would be replaced by a new directive put for-
ward by the European Commission on the same date as the proposal for a direc-
tive on market abuse. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Par-
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In its Action Plan for a Single Financial Market of 1999, the Euro-
pean Commission announced its intention, inter alia, to put for-
ward a directive concerning market manipulation commencing in
late 2000.7 The Forum of European Securities Commissions
("FESCO"), an organization of public supervisory authorities in the
Member States, enthusiastically supported the idea.8 FESCO fur-
thermore suggested the initiative should imitate the British ap-
proach applied in the recent reform that led to the Financial Serv-
ices and Markets Act 2000 ("FISMA 2000"), which in turn set up an
administrative regime on market abuse, i.e., insider dealing and
market manipulation.9 In fact, FESCO's proposal was similar to
the definition of market abuse found in FISMA 2000 Section 118.10
A group of wise men, the gender-biased term for a group of
experts within securities regulation, chaired by Mr. Alexandre
Lamfalussy and entrusted by the European Commission to map
out the regulatory needs of the European financial markets, sup-
ported the idea in their report on the necessary regulation lacking
to create a single European securities market." Finally, the Euro-
pean Commission put forward its proposal on May 30, 2001, for a
Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market
Abuse) that would replace the older directive on insider dealing
from 1989 and introduce a new prohibition on market manipula-
tion and a few new mandatory disclosure obligations.
12
liament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, COM(01)280 final, at 1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comin/internalmarket/eu/finances/mob.1/com280eu.
pdf.
7 Action Plan for a Single Financial Market, COM(99) at 1.
8 Forum of European Securities Commissions, Market Abuse: FESCO's Re-
sponse to the Call for Views From the Securities Regulators Under the EU's Ac-
tion Plan for Financial Services, COM(99)232, at 2 [hereinafter FESCO's Response],
available at http://www.europefesco.org/documents/recentpub/99-0961.pdf.
9 The British administrative regime in FISMA 2000 was thus supplementing
the original criminal regime on insider dealing and market manipulation that was
left in force. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8 (Eng.) [hereinafter
FISMA 20001.
10 Compare FESCO's Response, supra note 8 (stating market abuse should
cover material misuse of information and dissemination of false information), with
FISMA 2000, supra note 9, art. 118 (defining market abuse in similar terms).
11 Committee of Wise Men, Final Report on the Regulation of European Secu-
rities Markets (2001), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/en /finances/general/lanfalussyen.pdf. [hereinafter Wise Men].
12 See Proposal, supra note 4, at 15.
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2. COMITOLOGY
It should be pointed out here that the Lamfalussy Group's most
important recommendation did not concern specific provisions of
securities regulation but the overall legislative approach. The Wise
Men recommended a four-level approach to securities regulation:
framework principles, implementing measures, cooperation
among the authorities of the Member States, and enforcement13
The Council of Ministers adopted this approach at the Stockholm
Summit in March 2001.14 Only the first two levels are of interest
here and shall be discussed in the following.
The usual legislative procedure of the European Union is based
on a division of powers between the European Commission, being
a supra-national body on the one hand, and the Member States on
the other hand represented by the Council of Ministers with some
minor influence afforded to the European Parliament. The Euro-
pean Commission is headed by commissioners appointed by the
Member States but, by oath, committed to pursue pan-European
interests only. The Council of Ministers is comprised of represen-
tatives of the governments of the Member States. The European
Parliament is placed somewhere in between, as it is comprised of
politicians elected by popular vote in the individual Member States
directly to the European Parliament. The right of initiative, i.e., the
power to propose legislation, is vested with the European Com-
mission, which normally fulfills an executive function, whereas the
power to legislate is vested with the Council of Ministers, usually
acting in cooperation with the European Parliament. 5 According
to the new approach of the Lamfalussy Group, however, directives
in this area should be drafted even more broadly than usual, i.e., as
framework directives which simply state the overall principles,
whereas the comitology procedure should be used to lay down the
technical implementation measures.16
13 Wise Men, supra note 11, at 19.
14 See Overview of Summit, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
stockholm counciI/.
15 There are different procedures for passing legislation but the most com-
mon is the so-called co-decision procedure. See EC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 251
(implying certain cooperation between the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament).
16 In its report, the Lamfalussy Group describes the level 1 framework prin-
ciples: "The framework principles are the core political principles, the essential
elements of each proposal. They reflect the key political choices to be taken by the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers on the basis of a proposal by
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The current comitology procedure is based on the Council of
Ministers' Decision of June 28,1999.17 By this procedure, the Euro-
pean Commission is authorized to settle the technical implementa-
tion of directives in cooperation with an independent committee
consisting of experts appointed by the Member States. There are
several such committees, each specialized to cooperate with the
European Commission in different areas of regulation. In the area
of securities regulation, the relevant committee is the newly estab-
lished European Securities Committee ("ESC").'8 Thus, comitology
has been applied for years in European law-making, but the
change is in the emphasis. Comitology should no longer be re-
stricted to minor technical issues but should carry the main re-
sponsibility of laying down the specific content of the directive
within the framework set forth by the directive via the ordinary
legislative process.
The comitology procedure is obviously intended to streamline
and make more efficient the cumbersome legislative procedure
originally intended by the founding fathers of what is now the
European Union. However, the perceived need to speed up legis-
lation in the financial area should not overshadow the more fun-
the European Commission.... Level I principles should clearly specify the na-
ture and the extent of the technical implementing measures that should be taken
at the second level and the limits within which the resulting provisions can be
adapted and updated at that level without requiring a change of framework leg-
islation." Wise Men, supra note 11, at 22-23.
17 Council Decision 99/468,1999 Oj. (L 184) 23. The predecessor was Coun-
cil Decision 87/373, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33. On the comitology decision, see Koen
Lenaerts & Amaryllis Verhoeven, Towards a Legal Framework for Executive Rule-
Making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision, 37 COMMON
MKr. L. REv. 645 (2000). On comitology in general and the difficulties it raises in
respect of law and policy, see EU CoMMrTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
POLITcs (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos, eds., 1999) (noting that this book was
written before the current decision).
18 The European Securities Committee (ESC) was instituted in Commission De-
cision 01/528, 2001 Oj. (L 191) 45. The ESC is composed of high ranking repre-
sentatives of Member States and chaired by the European Commission. It may
invite experts and observers to participate in its meetings. The ESC will be
chaired by the European Commission, which will also provide the Secretariat.
The votes of the representatives are weighed in the same manner as the votes cast
in the Council of Ministers. See EC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 205(2). Thus, the ESC
will replicate the balance of power within the Council of Ministers. On the same
day, the European Commission also established the Committee of European Securi-
ties Regulators (CESR) in Commission Decision 01/527,2001 O.J. (L 191) 43. CESR
has in effect taken over the work done by FESCO. See Press Release, First Meeting
of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) (Sept. 19, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.europefesco.org/vl/frmPressRelease.htm.
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damental political problem raised by this new approach. Even a
cursory reading of the Federalist Papers would make it clear that
James Madison and the other founding fathers of the United States
knew very well that the distribution of powers enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution would make lawmaking in the Union difficult
and sometimes even impossible, and that was a stifling effect that
they found highly desirable.
It is not obvious that more legislation is what the financial
market needs, especially since there seems to be a rapid develop-
ment in the private norms of the financial players prompted by
market forces.19 Governments may feel that they have lost the up-
per hand in regulating their financial markets, but that may simply
reflect that the financial players are being disciplined by other
forces that are ahead of government regulation, such as, the forces
unleashed by the relentless competition due to an increasingly
globalized economy and the transparency brought about by the
progress in information technology. 20 In fact, considering the tra-
dition in Europe for interventionist lawmaking, one could argue
that the financial market is better off with a European Union that is
as slow at lawmaking as the United States.21
19 The inter-relatedness of the financial markets and the connected cross-
border influence of securities regulation on foreign legal systems is by now well-
known and debated. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
641 (1999). The influence of American securities regulation in Europe is a favored
topic, especially among American scholars. The influence of Europe on the
United States is less noted but nonetheless important. Among other things, the
advance of concentrated ownership and the dualistic approach to management
with a separation of supervision and management reflect this influence.
20 It is significant that the support for the Lamfalussy Group's proposals for
enhanced European Union lawmaking has primarily come from FESCO, the asso-
ciation of supervisory authorities of the Member States, and that the Lamfalussy
Group consisted of several former high ranking officials, including Mr. Alexandre
Lamfalussy himself, a distinguished former president of the European Monetary
Institute. A recent report published by Finansinspektionen, the Swedish financial
watchdog, also emphasizes the importance of private norms as a valuable and vi-
able alternative to legislative regulation. Jonas Niemeyer, Mhere to Go After the
Lamfalussy Report, 8 FINANSINSPEKTIONEN REP. 1 (2001), available at http://www.fi.
se/english /index.asp.
21 The United States has done quite well with its securities acts of the 1930s,
given a few amendments down the road. This observation is not disturbed by the
fact that a general overhaul of the acts has been announced by U.S. Senator Phil
Gramm of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. See Press Release,
Senate Banking Committee, Gramm Outlines Committee Agenda for the 107th
Congress (an. 22, 2001), available at http://banking.senate.gov/pre101/0122
prcf.htm.
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Besides this overall political problem, the procedure also has
the effect of making it difficult to assess the content of a proposed
framework directive, such as the one at hand on market abuse, be-
cause it is difficult to know exactly how the broad principles will
be fleshed out during the comitology phase. This caveat should be
kept in mind when discussing the said proposal.
The comitology procedure is elaborate and will not be dis-
cussed here; it will suffice to say that the procedure envisaged in
the proposed directive is the regulatory procedure provided for in
Article 5 of the Decision on Comitology, according to which the
European Commission can issue binding rules within the frame-
work set by the directive after negotiating the rules with the ESC
and subject to its acceptance.22 If the ESC opposes the rules, the
European Commission may take its proposal to the Council of
Ministers, which must respond by qualified majority within a cer-
tain time limit of not more than three months. If the Council of
Ministers fails to respond, the European Commission may pass the
measures. If the Council of Ministers approves, the measures are
passed. If not, the European Commission can make amendments,
put its proposal forward again, or use its ordinary powers of ini-
tiative under the EC Treaty to put forward a proposal for the
Council of Ministers.Z3
3. THE REGULATION OF INFORMATION
Before we proceed to look at the proposal, it is wise to take a
step back and look at the overall picture, that is, the perennial
question of why we regulate information in the first place.
As pointed out by George Akerlof in his seminal Lemon The-
ory, informational asymmetries may lead to illiquidity as informa-
tionally disadvantaged buyers either stay away from the market-
place or reduce the prices they are ready to pay to account for risk,
which in turn will keep sellers of higher quality goods away as
they perceive the prices as being too low.24 This leaves only sellers
of inferior goods in the market, ultimately leading to adverse se-
22 The measures resulting from the comitology procedure correspond to the
legal instrument authorizing the procedure. A framework directive would lead to
implementing directives, and a regulation would lead to implementing regula-
tions.
23 Council Decision 99/468, supra note 17.
24 George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1970).
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lection.2 5 Thus, any market, be it used cars, real estate, or securi-
ties, needs to alleviate informational asymmetries.
This can mainly be achieved in three ways. One way is to
oblige the informed party to disclose any information and thereby
eradicate his or her monopoly on information. The second way is
to prohibit the informed party from making use of the informa-
tional advantage. These two ways both address the same problem:
that one person knows more than the next. However, informa-
tional asymmetry may also exist if one person is misinformed and
another is not. The third way to avoid informational asymmetries
is consequently to prevent the creation of new asymmetries by
prohibiting active misinformation, which occurs when one party
misinforms another party.
Whereas the first two ways address the same problem, sup-
plementing each other, the third way is complementary to the first,
as they both concern the act of informing others; they are both
about communication. The informed party can either be com-
pelled to disclose the important bits of information or can be pro-
hibited from disclosing false information. It is often unnecessary to
compel the disclosure of information in relation to a seller of goods
because the seller has to inform the public to attract buyers. Con-
sequently, the common goal of preventing informational asymme-
tries is often achieved simply by prohibiting misinformation, such
as lying or other forms of trickery. With an incentive to disclose
and a prohibition against lying, the seller has no other choice than
to speak the truth or forego the transaction. This is why prohibi-
tions on misinformation are found in very old regulations of mar-
kets, such as the laws of the Babylonian ruler Hammurabi, whereas
actual disclosure obligations are a feature of modem law, espe-
cially within consumer protection. Thus, as these three ways of
alleviating informational asymmetries are common in the modem
regulation of markets for various goods, we should not be sur-
prised to find them in securities regulation, where they are well
known as mandatory disclosure obligations, prohibitions on in-
sider dealing, and market manipulation (securities fraud).
However, once we are directed at recognizing the close rela-
tionship between the regulation of information in securities mar-
kets and in markets for other goods, we should also notice that
eliminating informational asymmetries is not the sole purpose of
2 Id. at 488.
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market regulation. On the contrary, granting the benefit of exclu-
sivity to those who have gathered, processed, and enhanced the
available information is common. Because information is essen-
tially a common good, that is, there is no rivalry in its consumption
and no way to confine its dissemination, the law has to offer exclu-
sivity by regulation. 26 One such obvious example is the grant of
patent rights for inventions, which, in the United States, is a con-
stitutional affair.
The need for allowing one to enjoy the benefits and reap the
rewards of private information is as necessary as the prevention of
informational asymmetries because it leads to a beneficial quest for
innovation that ensures the dynamic development of technology
and an efficient use of resources. Consequently, these two con-
flicting interests must be balanced. Again, the old phenomenon of
patents illustrates this balancing of conflicting interests. The in-
ventor is granted exclusivity to the enhanced information, which is
his or her invention, enabling the inventor to profit from it and
thereby recoup expenses. The inventor will not be granted the pat-
ent unless the invention is indeed innovative because that would
unfairly prejudice others from using it. The need to enhance tech-
nological development is met partly by obliging the patent-holder
to disclose the information and make public the invention. This
can be done without detriment, as the law protects the inventor's
exclusive right to use the innovation, partly by putting a time-limit
on the exclusivity of the patent, after which it will expire and go
into the public. domain. There are other examples of balancing the
conflicting needs of disseminating information with exclusivity. A
seller of goods must inform the customer of important defects in
the goods for sale that are known to the seller and that the seller
should understand are important to the buyer. But the seller need
not disclose unimportant information or information of which the
26 In contrast to common law, Nordic law finds it difficult to consider infor-
mation as "property" due to its inherently immaterial character. Full residual
authority cannot be exercised over information as it can be with a physical good.
Rather, the right to certain information is considered to be a specific right limited
to the extent afforded by the law in force. For example, a copyright is offered by
the Copyright Act, but the rights conveyed are limited in time, that is, they expire,
and a copyright holder has to accept bona fide copying, such as quotations. Gen-
eral, unrestricted and timeless ownership is thus not available. However, this is
not so different from common law, where the right to exclude, which is the most
important right in relation to information, is considered "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
United States v. Aetna, 444 U.S. 164,176 (1979).
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buyer should be aware (buyer beware, as the adage goes).27 Thus,
the seller should inform the buyer if a used car has a defective
motor that is likely to break down after a few miles but does not
have to disclose that a similar used car can be bought just around
the comer at half the price. Although this is important information
as well, the buyer should find that out for himself and is disci-
plined in this way if he does not.
It is important to point out that this balancing of interests is in-
herent in the regulation of information and that it consequently
should apply within securities regulation as well.
4. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO INSIDER DEALING
It follows from the nature of European harmonization that di-
rectives cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, the directives
should be viewed as implemented in national law. This account of
the European approach to insider dealing is consequently given in
the background of Danish or Nordic law.
The regulation of insider dealing in Europe can trace its roots
to U.S. federal securities regulation. In the early 1960s, the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission applied the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder to transactions carried out on
an exchange. 28 This was upheld by the Court of Appeals (2d Cir.)
in its 1968 decision, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.29 Although re-
jecting a parity-of-information doctrine, the Court upheld the equal
access theory proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. The American approach was later restricted significantly by
the Supreme Court in its 1980 decision, United States v. Chiarella.30
Before that, however, the quest against insider dealing had leapt
across the ocean to Europe, where legislation aimed at insider
dealing was introduced in France (1970) and in Sweden (1971).31
27 This is the position in Nordic contract law and the law on the sale of goods.
A similar position seems to apply to U.S. law. See Kim Lane Scheppele, "t's Just
Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Dealing, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993).
28 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
29 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 833-889 (2d Cir. 1968).
30 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 222-52 (2d Cir. 1980). The Ameri-
can approach was later expanded again in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997), infra text accompanying note 44.
31 An outright ban was not introduced at first in Swedish law. Rather, the
insiders of a listed company were obliged to register their shares in a public reg-
istry.
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The British solution was first, and predictably, to deal with the
problem by self-regulation (1976). Inspired by this approach, the
European Commission issued a non-binding recommendation cov-
ering, inter alia, insider dealing in 1977.32 However, in 1980, the
United Kingdom enacted criminal legislation against insider deal-
ing, followed by Norway (1985), Sweden (1985), and Denmark
(1986). As more and more countries adopted legislation to address
the problem, the European Commission eventually proposed a di-
rective, which became the 1989 Directive on Insider Dealing.33
The basis for regulating insider dealing in European law is a
market approach, that is, an attempt to protect the market players
and ensure their trust in the fairness of the market. Before this be-
comes too euphemistic, it should be pointed out, however, that this
is not an attempt to protect the proverbial widows and orphans.
The flock to be protected from the lurking insiders is the small, ex-
tremely rich, and in every way privileged class of professional in-
vestors and their band of securities analysts. It is only they who,
with their substantial and expansive knowledge of the individual
securities, can perceive it a threat if material information that is not
publicly available and thus outside their reach is used to trade
against them. The lay investor, on the other hand, is never on top
of the available information and is thus always at a disadvantage
when compared to the professionals. The risk of trading with an
opponent using inside information is hardly discernible to lay in-
vestors compared with their general informational disadvantage.
To put it bluntly, the support for action against insider dealing
usually voiced by professional investors is provoked by a fear of
being placed on the same dismal footing as that of the lay investor.
However, considering the importance of the pricing mechanism to
the professional investors, which includes moving large sums each
day, it is justifiable to cater to their interests. Even though the be-
lief vested in the efficient capital market hypothesis by regulators
and academics alike is probably too sanguine, it is reasonable to
contend that the absence of insider dealing, thus defined, will
make the pricing of securities more sound, which also benefits the
lay investor.
32 Recommendation 77/537/EEC of the Commission Concerning a European
Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities, 1977 OJ. (L
212) 23. The recommendation foreshadowed the directives that were later passed
in the 1980s. See supra note 6.
33 See Council Directive 89/592, supra note 6.
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This market approach, which is found not only in the Nordic
countries but in European law generally, as expressed by the 1989
Insider Dealing Directive, differs from the approach found in U.S.
federal securities regulation. With the decision in Chiarella in
1980,34 the Supreme Court continued a trend to bridle the Securities
and Exchange Commission's ("Commission") expansive applica-
tion of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 starting
with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder from 1976.35 The gist of the prob-
lem caused by the Commission's approach to combat insider
dealing was distinctly put in the dictum of Justice Powell in Chi-
arella: Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but
what it catches must be fraud.36
The ban on insider dealing in U.S. federal law is almost like the
British Constitution: it is one of the world's finest, but it has never
been put in writing. Neither of the two securities acts of the early
1930s prohibit insider dealing. No doubt the problem of insider
dealing was very much a concern to President Roosevelt and his
New Dealers, but they stopped short of promulgating a prohibition
on insider dealing, opting instead for a prophylactic ban on short-
swing profits in Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 that would catch insider dealing and other more harmless in-
stances. Rather than addressing this shortcoming of the securities
acts, the Commission tried to expand the scope of the provisions at
hand, first by promulgating Rule 10b-5 in the early 1940s, effec-
tively expanding the anti-fraud provision of Section 17 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 that only covers the sale of securities, and then in
the early 1960s in Cady, Roberts & Co., by expanding the use of Rule
10b-5 to transactions carried out through a stock exchange. 37
However, an anti-fraud provision is not a useful weapon for
attacking transactions in such an anonymous marketplace as a se-
curities exchange because the personal relationship between buyer
and seller is as absent as the proximity between them. In face-to-
face transactions, it is reasonable to expect the informed party to
take into account any apparent informational disadvantage that the
other party may exhibit, and it is easy to contend that an informa-
tionally advantaged party has induced the less informed counter-
part to the transaction. This is the stuff a person needs in order to
34 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
35 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
36 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234.
37 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC at 907.
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claim fraud. But exchange transactions are different. They are car-
ried out between consenting adults who have decided to engage in
the transaction purely out of their own will and inclination. There
is no room for communication or inducements in exchange trans-
actions except for the rudimentary forms of communication arising
out of the indications to either buy or sell a given security at the
preferred price.m
The prohibition on insider dealing is now an established part of
U.S. federal securities regulation, supported by both extensive
court practice and legislation by Congress, but the whole frame-
work is still based on the anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act.39 So ever since Chiarella, the search has been on to
find a relationship of trust, the breach of which could constitute
fraud, whereas the main purpose of protecting the market players
has been degraded to a more accidental, albeit highly desirable,
byproduct.
Despite this deficiency of the U.S. approach, the practical im-
plications are mostly small and insignificant. A bond of loyalty is
readily available within the corporate entity, also known as the
listed issuer. Contrary to the somewhat quaint proposition of
British company law, company law in the United States has always
recognized the fiduciary duties owed by the management of the
company not only to the company itself but also towards its share-
holders. 40 This loyalty has been extended to future shareholders,
that is, investors opting to buy shares.41 As most cases concerning
33 Naturally, this difference has not escaped the U.S. Supreme Court In rela-
tion to the requirement of reliance, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44
(1988) ("The modem securities markets, literally involving millions of shares
changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by
the early fraud cases .... ."). The Court's insistence on a special relationship of
loyalty in Rule 10b-5 cases even in exchange transactions is thus not an oversight
but prompted by the legislation at hand. The judiciary can hardly be blamed for
the legislature's failure to provide the executive branch with the necessary meas-
ures.
39 For example, the new Rule 10b5-1 defining when a purchase or sale con-
stitutes trading "on the basis of" material non-public information in insider deal-
ing cases carries the following proviso: "The law of insider dealing is otherwise
defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not
modify the scope of insider dealing law in any other respect." See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
40 The difference between company law in the United Kingdom and in the
United States can be explored by comparing Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902),
with Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
41 Nicely put by Justice Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46,49
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insider dealing are brought by insiders, the narrow confinement to
a basis of loyalty does not seriously impair the operation of the
prohibition.
However, the problems begin when addressing persons who
are not insiders but who have been derivatively informed or who
are informed by information that is not genuinely inside, that is,
not relating to the internal affairs of the company at which the in-
formed person works.42 The first problem was solved effectively,
though not graciously, by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1983 deci-
sion in Dirks v. SEC, introducing the concepts of the temporary in-
sider and tippee liability.43 But again, this was based on strenuous
concepts of loyalty towards the company and not, as one would
expect, on a need to protect the persons entering into transactions
with the informed tippee.
The second problem was solved by the Supreme Court in its
1997 decision in United States v. O'Hagan.44 Here, a majority of jus-
tices opted for the misappropriation theory suggested by the dis-
senting justices in Chiarella and eagerly greeted by the Second Cir-
cuit shortly after the ruling in Chiarella in cases such as United
States. v. Newman and SEC v. Materia.45 According to this theory,
the necessary loyalty is towards the rightful owner of the inside in-
formation. If the informed party has violated this obligation of
loyalty by misappropriating the information in order to trade on it,
the necessary requirement of fraud is present. From a European
view, however, one feels obliged to agree with the dissenting Jus-
tices Thomas and Rehnquist, that this construction, as welcomed as
the result may be, is only accomplished by a tortuous use of the
law. The main problem is, surely, that if the issuer should follow
the lead that has long been contended by distinguished law profes-
(2d Cir. 1951), "It would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage
of this position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he
was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one."
42 It is testament to the huge influence of U.S. law on European law that we
have borrowed the phrase "insider dealing" and "inside information," when we,
by "inside information," actually mean non-public information of all kinds and by
"insider" refer to all persons having inside information regardless of their posi-
tion.
43 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
44 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
45 SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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sors such as Henry Manne46 and allow for its directors to trade on
inside information, there would be no misappropriation of the in-
formation and hence no offense of insider dealing. 47 Likewise, in
the more practical example of warehousing, that is, the orchestrated
buying up of shares in a target company usually initiated by the
party who aims at taking over the target and who is consequently
expected by the other parties to take over their shares at a later
time.48 Here, there is no misappropriation of the non-public infor-
mation that a takeover is imminent by the parties buying the
shares.
But again, consolation can be obtained from the practical ob-
servation that, when material information is non-public, it is usu-
ally because somebody controlling that information does not want
it to be used in securities trading for somebody else's personal
gain, and, consequently, we can expect the misappropriation the-
ory to catch, if not all, then nearly all cases involving the exploita-
tion of material non-public information. This does not catch ware-
housing, but, as the O'Hagan Court also upheld Rule 14e-3, which
does not rely on a special relationship of trust but operates in a
takeover context, warehousing operating in violation of the special
disclosure rules pursuant to the Williams Act is likely to be pun-
ishable just the same.
Nevertheless, the European approach to insider dealing does
seem to be more useful and logically consistent, emphasizing the
market and the transactions carried out there and not the illusive
bonds of loyalty that may or may not be spun between autono-
mous market players.
5. INSIDER DEALING
In its comments on the proposed directive, the European
Commission states that the proposal has not materially changed
the old 1989 Insider Dealing Directive that it will replace. This is
true insofar as the proposal prohibits trading on inside information
and selective disclosure, respectively, which is banned in Article 2
46 HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
47 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 690 (1997). For a critique along the
lines offered here, see Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Re-
gime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1999).
48 Warehousing was touched upon but left undecided in both Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 242-43, and O Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672 n.17.
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and Article 3 of the 1989 Directive. The proposal has, however, a
different approach.
The 1989 Directive relies on the dichotomy between primary
and secondary insiders. A primary insider would be informed by
way of his position, e.g., as a member of the board of a listed com-
pany.49 A secondary insider would be a person informed by a
primary insider, i.e., a tippee.50 The two prohibitions on insider
dealing and selective disclosure would apply to a primary insider.
A secondary insider would only be subject to the prohibition on in-
sider dealing unless the Member State had opted to extend the
prohibition on selective disclosure to secondary insiders.
5'
The dichotomy of primary and secondary insiders in the 1989
Insider Dealing Directive was probably inspired by the U.S. federal
securities regulation's loyalty-based approach to insider dealing.
In its early form, the U.S. ban on insider dealing aimed at corporate
insiders of the Texas Gulf Sulphur kind, who had unique access to
inside information, whereas outsiders such as securities analyst
Raymond Dirks would only be liable if their source was an in-
sider.52 In a market context, however, such a dichotomy is moot. It
is not relevant how the insider got the information but whether the
informed party should be allowed to exploit it in a market transac-
tion. Furthermore, the dichotomy is even more redundant now, as
the prohibition on insider dealing in Article 2 and selective disdo-
sure in Article 3 of the proposal must both apply to secondary in-
siders, whereas the 1989 Directive on Insider Dealing made it op-
tional whether to extend the prohibition on selective disclosure to
secondary insiders.
The reason for maintaining the dichotomy seems to be that the
drafters have deleted the attribution of full knowledge of the facts
in the description of the prohibition pertaining to primary insiders,
which is the way the prohibition is worded in the existing 1989 In-
sider Dealing Directive, but have kept the attribution with respect
to secondary insiders. The requirement of full knowledge indi-
cates that mens rea requires proof of intent (dolus). The absence of
this requirement would thus indicate that a lesser form of mens rea
would suffice with respect to primary insiders, e.g., negligence
49 Council Directive 89/592, supra note 6, art. 2(1). The prohibition also cov-
ers legal persons, e.g., a listed issuer. Id. art. 2(2).
50 Id. art. 4.
51 Id. art. 6.
52 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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(culpa). Thus, the absence of the requirement with respect to pri-
mary insiders in the proposal is an indication that a negligence
standard shall be applied in respect of primary insiders, whereas it
is still up to the Member States whether they would apply the
same low standard to secondary insiders. This is already the case
in many Member States including the Nordic countries, as the
Member States are at liberty under the 1989 Directive to implement
stricter rules than what follow from the directive.53 In Nordic law,
for example, a person must be shown to be in possession of inside
information, but his qualification of the information as inside in-
formation could be negligent; this applies to all persons so in-
formed regardless of whether they would qualify as primary or
secondary insiders according to the 1989 Directive.
6. DIscLosuRE
6.1. Selective Disclosure
The prophylactic prohibition on selective disclosure by primary
insiders in Article 3(a) of the 1989 Insider Dealing Directive was
intended to prevent insider dealing. The proposal does not seem
to present any real change compared with the existing prohibition.
The prohibition on selective disclosure in Article 3 of the proposal
has maintained the broad exemption for disclosure when it is done
in the normal course of business.
The ban on selective disclosure by insiders in the Insider Deal-
ing Directive has been supplemented by a ban on selective disclo-
sure by the issuer itself in Article 6(2), which tries to emulate the
recent Regulation Fair Disclosure of U.S. federal securities regula-
tion. It does so quite faithfully and should not present any prob-
lems, especially as selective disclosure carried out in a setting of
confidentiality is excluded from the obligation to disclose the in-
formation. This ban on selective disclosure by the issuer should be
viewed against the background of the existing general disclosure
obligation discussed in the following.
53 However, if stricter rules are made, they must apply generally. Council
Directive 89/592, supra note 6, art. 6. The European Court of Justice has ruled that
a stricter standard in national law in respect to primary insiders cannot exempt
holding companies as a special group. The stricter standard must apply to all
who qualify as a primary insider or be disregarded as contrary to Community
law. Case C-28/99, Belgium v. Jean Verdonck, 2001 E.C.R. 1-3399.
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6.2. A General Disclosure Obligation
The 1979 Directive on the Conditions for the Admission of Se-
curities to Official Stock Exchange Listing carried a general disclo-
sure obligation in respect of any major new developments in its
sphere of activity which are not public knowledge and which may,
by virtue of their effect on its assets and liabilities or financial posi-
tion or on the general course of its business, lead to substantial
movements in the prices of its shares.5 4 Disclosure should be done
automatically at the initiative of the issuer itself and performed as
soon as possible. Thus, selective disclosures by issuers have long
been banned in Europe. The new proposal would introduce a
mandatory disclosure obligation of its own, which is very close to
that of the 1979 Directive.55
This general disclosure obligation of European law would seem
to be very far reaching, apparently aiming at all price-sensitive
material information. However, it is important to note that besides
the explicit exemption that the directive provides, the disclosure
obligation itself is construed as providing a further exemption.
Thus, the competent authority, which is usually the stock exchange
on which the issuer is listed, does not expect, and indeed does not
get, all material price-sensitive non-public information. Rather, the
issuers are only expected to inform of matters that will be made
public at a certain time, either because the event to which the in-
formation is pertaining will become publicly known, or, more im-
portantly, because the facts will appear in the public accounts pub-
lished annually, semi-annually or quarterly. It is only in relation to
this kind of information that the issuer is expected to file for an ex-
emption which, by the way, is most often not granted. Trade se-
crets, ongoing research efforts, business plans, and tactical delib-
erations not yet implemented are thus not covered by this general
mandatory disclosure obligation, though they may be material,
unless and until they are covered by the obligation to disclose them
54 Council Directive 79/279, Annex C, sec. 5(a), 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, 30 (dis-
cussing obligations with respect to an issuer of shares). In respect of an issuer of
bonds, a similar disclosure obligation follows from Annex D, Section 4(a); how-
ever, the effect of the non-public news is to be on the issuer's "ability to meet its
commitments." Id. Annex D, sec. 4(a).
55 Id. art 6(1). According to the Proposal, "Member States shall ensure that
issuers of financial instruments inform the public as soon as possible of inside in-
formation." Proposal, supra note 4.
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directly or indirectly that may follow from other laws, notably
those regarding accountancy.
5 6
As demonstrated in Section 3, this construction of the manda-
tory disclosure obligation reflects a balancing of the interests in-
volved: that is, the interests of the investors in the market on the
one hand and the issuer who needs to keep certain kinds of infor-
mation confidential for competitive purposes. The real effect of the
provision is thus to oblige the issuer to speed up the process of dis-
closure rather than to delay the disclosure until the event becomes
public or the accounts are published. Most petitions for exemption
concern permission to delay disclosure, not to have the information
exempted from disclosure altogether. The disclosure obligation of
the proposal would probably be construed in the same way as jus-
tifying the non-disclosure of the kind of information necessary to
protect the issuer's position in the competition.
Furthermore, another limitation must be read into the pro-
posed provision. The disclosure obligation would apply to issuers
of financial instruments, and financial instruments would cover
transferable securities as defined in the 1993 Investment Services
Directive.5 7 But in that directive, the definition refers simply to
various securities such as shares and bonds that are negotiable on
the capital market.5 8 Surely, the mandatory disclosure obligation
envisaged in the proposal should only apply to issuers who have
by their own decision admitted their securities to listing or trading
on a regulated market, which is the common phrase of the pro-
posal and the 1993 Investment Services Directive to signify recog-
nized investment exchanges of the individual Member States.5 9
Indeed, the report by FESCO, which probably inspired the pro-
posal, has such a limitation.60 A reference to regulated markets is
present in Article 9 of the proposal, but that provision would only
56 The importance of accountancy in understanding securities regulation has
been noted for U.S. law as well by Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Se-
curities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1995). The paper further argues
that a similar trade-off between informing investors and protecting the value of
the issuer is applied in U.S. law. Id.
57 Council Directive 93/22, 1993 Oj. (L 141) 27 (discussing investment serv-
ices in the securities field).
5s Id. art 1(4).
59 See id. (referring to art. 1(13) of the 1993 Investment Services Directive,
Council Directive 93/22).
60 FESCO's Response, supra note 8 (limiting the definition of a financial in-
strument to those admitted to a regulated market).
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seem to address the question of territoriality concerning trading,
whereas a normal reading of the provision would not include dis-
closure being made or failing to be made.61 A more precise word-
ing of the proposed disclosure obligation in Article 6(1) would be
advisable. However, as the technical modalities of Article 6(1)
should be worked out by the European Commission using the
comitology procedure, the necessary adjustments may be achieved
that way even if the proposal were to be upheld in this respect by
the European Parliament and the Council.
7. MARKET MANIPULATION
7.1. The Concept of Manipulation
The balancing of conflicting interests that is so imperative
when construing mandatory disclosure obligations and the related
prohibitions on insider dealing and selective disclosure discussed
in Section 3 are absent when we turn to the last of the three ways of
preventing informational asymmetries, that of banning misinfor-
mation. Lies are never justified, although admittedly, we all have
to do it sometime. This makes it more straightforward to regulate
misinformation: Thou shalt not misinform.
However, two caveats should be observed. Communication in
the securities markets is carried out by more than verbal communi-
cation. The transactions themselves convey important information
that is rapidly interpreted and used by professional market play-
ers. Consequently, banning misinformation needs to address non-
verbal communication as well.
The second and more difficult caveat is how to define misin-
formation. Regardless of the trust and prestige invested in the
adoration of the efficient capital market hypothesis and the indis-
tinguishable capital asset pricing model, it is unrealistic to assume
that the quoted price of a security has the special propensity to be
true or represent the fundamental value of the issuer's future
earnings. The uncertainty of the future, the plethora of informa-
tion available at any given time, and the differences in human
comprehension all render such predictions impossible. Conse-
61 See the proposed Article 9, "The provisions of this Directive shall apply to
any financial instrument admitted, or going to be admitted, to trading on a regu-
lated market in at least one Member State, irrespective of whether the transaction
itself actually takes place on that market or not" Proposal, supra note 4.
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quently, it is not wrong to disagree with the current market price,
and indeed, the market price is constantly moved by the conflicting
opinions of the market players.62
But the fact that the price of a security cannot be regarded as
true, does not imply that it is impossible to lie. Even if the mean-
ing of truth lies within the individual and may differ among indi-
viduals, it is nevertheless meaningful to talk of lying when one in-
dividual conveys a message that is different from his or her
individual perception of the truth. This, in essence, is the meaning
of misrepresentation: to induce a perception within others that is
different from that of your own. This is an inescapably subjective
test, almost a judicial form of lobotomy, where we must look into
the mind of the communicator and make the individual perception
the starting-point of our investigation. But this does not prevent us
from applying objective means to establish this state of mind.
Could the communicator reasonably believe what he or she said;
how would a reasonable investor interpret the communication
made, and so on.
When it comes to nonverbal information, it becomes clear that
attention should be given to how the market players usually inter-
pret certain actions, and it can often be assumed that the communi-
cator of this nonverbal communication understands the effect his
or her communication, that is, that person's actions, will have.
This is why transactions such as wash sales and matched orders
are considered manipulative. Consequently, such actions should
be outlawed insofar as the parties do not take care to prevent any
misunderstanding.
However, as helpful as these objective means may be, they do
not change the underlying problem: misinformation can only be
discerned if the subjective opinion of the communicator is taken
into consideration. This leads to the problem of pursuing an ad-
ministrative regime rather than a criminal regime, as has been
done in the United Kingdom for market abuse.63 The proposed di-
rective would make administrative sanctioning mandatory as a
supplement to the criminal regime already in force in most Mem-
62 Naturally, it is possible to make the more modest claim that the market
price is the best guess at hand because it is the aggregated guess of the many
market players. And of course it is possible to define this best guess as the "true"
price. However, not only is this disturbingly tautological, it is also embarrass-
ingly inapt because this effectively gives up the possibility of verification, usually
associated with determining whether a statement is true.
63 FISMA 2000, supra note 9.
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ber States, and it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the dichot-
omy of criminal and administrative sanctioning.
7.2. A Criminal or an Administrative Regime?
As the case was with the Insider Dealing Sanctions Act of 1984
and the Insider Dealing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 with respect to U.S. federal securities regulation, the intro-
duction of an administrative regime in the British FISMA 2000 was
probably motivated to some extent by the promise that it would be
more operational than criminal law, which bristles with stubborn
old principles such as the presumption of innocence and a need to
prove mens rea, which usually leads to lengthy trials with a high
percentage of acquittals.
Naturally, the official position is to deny any such easement. In
an early publication made before the FISMA Bill was put before
Parliament on June 17, 2000, the British Financial Services Author-
ity said:
There is behavior which is capable of damaging markets
which does not constitute either insider dealing or market
manipulation and which the Government does not think it
would be proportionate to subject to the full weight of the
criminal law. It is not the intention of the new regime to
provide an easier route for taking action against criminal
insider dealing and market manipulation. These offences,
which are necessary and important deterrents, will remain
in place. Where criminal offences have been committed,
criminal prosecutions will, as now, continue to be taken
where appropriate.64
Although the administrative regime was subjected to amend-
ments during the legislative process, this understanding was
maintained. Criminal law is thus considered more narrow because
a clear intention to abuse the market was a prerequisite.65
64 FINANCIAL SECURITIES AUTHORITY, FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON RESPONSES TO
CONSULTATION PAPER 10: MARKET ABUSE 2 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/cp/cploresponse.pdf.
65 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSULTATION PAPER 59: MARKET ABUSE: A
DRAFT CODE OF MARKET CONDUCT (July 2000), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/cp/cp59.pdf.
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Thus, two interrelated advantages of an administrative regime
can be discerned. First, the cases can be kept out of the courts,
which are overburdened in most countries and not necessarily
filled with securities experts that have intimate knowledge of right
and wrong in securities trading. Second, the problem of proving
intent can be overcome simply by drafting the prohibitions differ-
ently, emphasizing bad acts (actus reus), ignoring mens rea, and
making offenders solely liable for penalties and the latter-day ver-
sion of the medieval pillory, known as the public censure (so-called
naming-and-shaming), but not fines or incarceration. Each of these
alleged advantages of the administrative regime should be consid-
ered more closely.
The promise of speeding up trials by having the cases handled
by an administrative body rather than an old fashioned court is re-
stricted somewhat by Section 1, Article 6(1) of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
guarantees the right of a fair trial by an independent and impartial
tribunal.66 The judicial body does not have to be a court, hence the
word "tribunal," but it does have to be independent and impartial,
which necessitates a division within the administrative body be-
tween those who bring the charge and those who decide these
cases. In France, a similar administrative regime had to be
changed to safeguard this right to a fair trial.67 To avoid that
problem, FISMA 2000 grants the right to bring administrative pro-
ceedings before an independent tribunal.68
Nevertheless, by setting up what effectively is a special juris-
diction court for the financial market equipped with expert judges,
the administrative regime does seem to offer an improvement. The
problems associated with the administrative regime spring from
the other alleged advantage, that of prosecuting more people than
under the criminal regimes.
As was the case with the procedural question of how to organ-
ize the administrative body deciding the charges made under an
administrative regime, the 1950 Convention on Human Rights not
66 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4,1950, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/echrtext.htin.
67 See CA Paris, Mar. 7, 2000, 2000 Bull. du Conseil National des Commis-
saires aux Comptes, No. 119 (holding that the persons who brought the charge
were also represented on the tribunal deciding the case. The rules on procedure
have now been changed).
68 FISMA 2000, supra note 9.
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only calls for independent and impartial tribunals, but Article 6(2)
maintains the presumption of innocence in criminal cases, Article
6(3) states certain procedural safeguards in these cases, and Article
7 requires criminal charges to be based on reasonably clear prohi-
bitions to comply with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.69
Whether a charge is criminal or administrative is not decided by
the Member State but by an autonomous interpretation based on
the Convention by the national courts and ultimately by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights itself.70
This is of particular interest in regard to market abuses, such as
insider dealing and market manipulation. Insofar as the raison
d'Ftre of the administrative regime is to make the difficult proof of a
guilty mind unnecessary, the administrative regime must be re-
stricted to only a subset of the actions deemed as being market
abuse in criminal law. It would be straightforward to include pro-
phylactic measures, such as the Section 16(b) short-swing profit
rule of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which operates on ob-
jective features: did the insider trade within the stated period or
not? This formalistic approach has problems of its own, as evi-
denced by the jurisprudence developed in U.S. federal law in re-
spect to unorthodox transactions, that is, transactions that are
caught by the short-swing profit rule but which are deemed unfair
because the underlying reason for applying the rule, the fear of in-
sider dealing, is moot because the insider has no material inside in-
formation to speak of.71 This does not, however, present a problem
in the context discussed here.
Further, as discussed in Section 7.1, objective indications can be
used to gauge whether a person engaged in certain transactions
intended those transactions to convey a false impression to other
market players. Thus, prohibiting certain forms of transactions,
such as wash sales, which are matched orders or transactions that
falsely appear to be arms-length, is feasible within an administra-
tive regime, without violating basic principles of fairness. Objec-
69 European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms, supra note 66, art
7.
70 E.g., Ozturk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudocldoc/HEJUD/sift/138.txt (holding a traffic violation to
be a criminal charge although it had been decriminalized in German law a few
years earlier and was now considered to be an administrative offense. Conse-
quently, the offender had the right to a trial before an independent and impartial
tribunal and the right to be heard in an adversarial procedure).
71 See Cox, supra note 1, at 819-25.
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tive fact-finding, such as determinations of whether the person en-
gaged in this kind of transaction or not, is well-suited to the ad-
ministrative regime. Persons engaging in such transactions should
know that they are likely to mislead other market players, and this
makes it appropriate to submit them to whatever sanctions an ad-
ministrative regime can offer.
But even these cases must allow for defenses and exemptions if
the parties engaged in the transactions are motivated by legitimate
reasons, such as trading between group-related companies at
prices that are inflated compared with the present market price.
Although such a transaction would appear to be a matched order
likely to mislead the market, it is not misleading if the parties to
the transaction disclose to the market that they belong to the same
group and that the transaction price does not reflect arms-length
negotiations. The need for defenses and exemptions arises because
the prohibitions are not just prophylactic but are aimed at crimes
that involve a guilty mind, where the objective features, such as the
transactions, are taken as proxies for the mental state of mind.
Thus, the person charged with such an offense should either have
the opportunity to prove his or her innocence or, at the very least,
the offense should include an exemption if adequate disclosure to
the market has been made.
The administrative approach becomes highly questionable,
however, for activities other than these prophylactic measures and
irregular transactions. This almost always applies to insider trad-
ing cases where the special state of mind of the informed party is
what makes the transaction unfair. But it would also be a problem
in most cases of market manipulation. When it cannot be said that
the acting party knew, or ought to have known, that his or her ac-
tions would mislead the market, we must satisfy ourselves that the
party did in fact aim to misinform.
This leads to the difficult problem of proving mens rea, known
from criminal law, and the application of an administrative regime
should not mitigate the substantial burden of proof that this leaves
for prosecutors. The principles of criminal law are derived from
the inherent imbalance of power between the state and the indi-
vidual, an imbalance that is not removed by simply re-labeling the
advisory relationship as administrative.
It would appear that these cases are not suitable for an admin-
istrative regime unless the regime is ready to forego the advan-
tages and adopt the principles and procedures of criminal law.
This is also the position taken by the government of Sweden, the
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most recent among the Nordic countries to have a major reform of
its securities regulation resulting in the Insider Penal Act and the
Securities Reporting Act, both of which became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 2001.72 Sweden's position in the Insider Penal Act of 2000
was that insider dealing and market manipulation should be kept
within a criminal regime, and the new act continued the criminal
regime of the old act except that it increased the criminal sanctions
available. 73 The prophylactic measures of Swedish securities regu-
lation, such as a reporting obligation for insiders and a short
swing-profit rule similar to that found in Section 16 of the U.S. Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, were placed in the administrative
Securities Reporting Act of 2000 and only subjected violators to
penalties, not the fines or imprisonment possible under the Insider
Penal Act of 2000.74
In all fairness, British securities regulation, which is the propo-
nent of the administrative regime, has taken these considerations
into account. Thus, the British administrative regime on market
abuse, according to the FISMA 2000, emphasizes in the vast major-
ity of cases subjective features such as the knowledge of the person
charged with market abuse and the purpose pursued through
these actions. The British Financial Services Authority stands by its
responsibility when acting as a prosecutor to prove these matters
by carrying the full burden of proof.75 Consequently, the British
administrative regime would seem to comply with the high stan-
dards expected in criminal law, making their insistence on the dis-
tinction seem rather whimsical. It could be argued that the ad-
ministrative regime changes the onus of proof from proving guilt
72 Insiderstrafflag, No. 1086 (2000) (Swed.) (describing the Swedish Insider
Penal Act) [hereinafter Insider Penal Act]; Lag om anmaelningsskyldighet for
vissa innehav av finansiella instrument, No. 1087 (2000) (Swed.), available at
http://www.fi.se/english/index.asp (describing the reporting obligations for
certain holdings of financial interest in the Securities Reporting Act) [hereinafter
Securities Reporting Act].
73 See Insider Penal Act, supra note 72, §§ 2,4-6 (discussing penal sanctions for
insider dealing) and § 9 (discussing penal sections for price manipulation).
74 See Securities Reporting Act, supra note 72, §§ 19-20 (discussing adminis-
trative sanctions for violation of the ban on short swing-profits and for a failure to
report).
75 See FINANCIAL SERvICEs AuTHORiTy, CODE OF MARKET CONDUCT: FEEDBACK
ON CP59 AND CP76: POLICY STATEMENT 10 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps59_76.pdf (explaining that the FSA has described in great
detail, after considerable consultations with market players, the behavior
amounting to market abuse).
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beyond reasonable doubt to a mere balance of probabilities. How-
ever, the difference is marginal, as a criminal regime does not nec-
essarily require intent (dolus) but can prescribe negligence (culpa) as
is often the case in Nordic law. Rather, the real benefit of the Brit-
ish legislative reform is probably found in the elaborate and care-
fully designed financial regulation that has been achieved.
7.3. The Proposal's Concept of Manipulation
Whereas the British experience has led to an administrative re-
gime with all the safeguards of a traditional criminal regime, the
new proposal for a directive on market abuse seems influenced by
the unrestrained boldness one might fear would motivate regula-
tors to clamor for an administrative regime. The proposal itself
calls for administrative and criminal sanctions. 6 The European
Commission frankly expresses the perceived need for an adminis-
trative regime because the proceedings are faster. Furthermore,
the Commission states that the definition of market manipulation
relies on the behavior of its authors, and not on their intention or
aim. This is in stark contrast to the more experienced observation
of the British Financial Services Authority that, "Knowledge is an
element in the description of behavior which amounts to market
abuse." 7
In the annex to the proposal, Section B provides a non-
exhaustive list of conduct that would amount to market manipula-
tion. Some of these examples are acceptable, such as wash sales.
Others bristle with difficulties, such as trading specifically to inter-
fere with the spot or the settlement price of derivative contracts.
Here, an evaluation of the person's state of mind seems necessary.
Likewise, making untrue statements of material fact may be justly
sanctionable without reference to mens rea if committed by profes-
sional market players who are subject to prior obligations of due
diligence with regard to those facts. This standard is, however,
overly excessive for lay investors using chat rooms and the like on
the Internet. Finally, non-disclosure of material facts or material
interests is mentioned as an example of an information-related ac-
tion that would constitute market manipulation, but surely must
76 As the European Community cannot expressly regulate sanctioning, the
Member States are left with the discretion to determine the actual sanctions avail-
able. See Proposal, supra note 4, art. 14(1).
77 FINANCIAL SERvICEs AUrHOFJTY, supra note 75, at 22 (discussing Chinese
walls in relation to avoiding false or misleading impressions being made).
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presuppose an obligation to disclose or an intent to deceive, unless
the situation is really about insider dealing, in which case estab-
lishing subjective knowledge is inescapable.
Thus, the examples given in Section B of the proposal are well-
known schemes of manipulation and deceit in the financial market
and as such, their inclusion in a directive aimed at combating mar-
ket abuse is laudable. However, a substantial part of these exam-
ples are to be subjected to an administrative regime. Due to the
framework character of the intended directive, it is not yet possible
to tell how the comitology procedure will deal with this problem,
but the enthusiasm for administrative sanctions expressed by the
European Commission in the comments to the proposal does not
bode well.
8. CONCLUSION
The recent proposal from the European Commission for a di-
rective on market abuse would not lead to any greater change with
respect to insider dealing or disclosure, be it selective or general.
In regards to market manipulation, the framework directive itself
does not seem to go further than what is already outlawed by the
laws of most Member States. The devil is in the details, however,
and the fact that the proposal is for a framework directive in which
the technical details are to be hammered out by the European
Commission working with the new technocratic European Securi-
ties Committee, combined with their enthusiasm for administrative
sanctioning and neglecting the issue of mens rea in lieu of more ob-
jective features, could give cause for concern. Whether such a con-
cern is justified remains to be seen.
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